In this paper, we outline a framework for understanding the different kinds of knowledge required for medical practice and use this framework to show how scientism undermines aspects of this knowledge. The framework is based on Michael Polanyi’s claim that knowledge is primarily the product of the contemplations and convictions of persons and yet at the same time carries a sense of universality because it grasps at reality. Building on Polanyi’s ideas, we propose that knowledge can be described along two (...) intersecting “dimensions”: the tacit–explicit and the particular–general. These dimensions supersede the familiar “objective−subjective” dichotomy, as they more accurately describe the relationship between medical science and medical practice. Scientism, we argue, excludes tacit and particular knowledge and thereby distorts “clinical reality” and impairs medical practice and medical ethics. (shrink)

"Explores historically the whole intellectual development of Orestes Brownson and places his political thought into [the context of Civil War-era America]." -- Preface.

Ethical dilemmas involving tax issues were identified by members of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as posing the most difficult ethical problem for them (Finn et al., Journal of Business Ethics 7(8), pp. 607–609, 1988). The KPMG tax shelter fraud case proves that the tax profession has not gone untainted in the age of numerous accounting and corporate scandals, such as the Enron débâcle (Sikka and Hampton, Accounting Forum 29(3), 325–343, 2005). High-profile scandals serve to highlight the problems (...) caused by differences in ethical judgement among accountants and tax practitioners and the issue of ethics has been brought publicly to the forefront of the profession. Nevertheless, the nature and dimension of ethical issues in tax practice have been largely unexplored (Erard, Journal of Public Economics 52(2), 163–197, 1993; Marshall et al., Journal of Business Ethics 17(12), 1265–1279, 1998; Frecknall Hughes, Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Leeds, 2002). This research aims to contribute to the debate on ethics in tax practice by reporting interview data on tax practitioners’ perceptions of ethics in the jurisdictions of Ireland and the United Kingdom and exploring the link or equation of ethics with risk management. (shrink)

Viewed in its entirety, moral philosophizing, and the moral behavior of people throughout history, presents a curious puzzle. On the one hand, interpersonal duties display a remarkably stable core content: morality the world over enjoins people to keep their word; refrain from violence, theft and cheating; and help those in need. On the other hand, the asserted motives that drive people’s moral actions evince a dazzling diversity: from empathy or sympathy, to practical or prudential reason, to custom and honor, cultural (...) identity, excellence and independence, faith and spirituality, narrative and beauty, and more besides. I term this twin phenomenon—a core of fixed moral duties driven by diverse motives—“moral motive pluralism.” In this article, I marshal evidence to show the prevalence of the phenomenon. Contrary to widespread assumptions, across generations and cultures, diverse motives drive different people to perform their moral duties. But despite this diversity, each different motive impels conscientious compliance with the same core moral duties. I argue this phenomenon undermines key types of evidence commonly employed to justify popular moral philosophies, and provides us with reason to seriously consider certain sorts of ethical theories—especially “functionalist” accounts of morality. (shrink)

Keith Thomas: Gerald Edward Aylmer, 1926-2000 Adrian Hollis: William Spencer Barrett, 1914-2001 Bruce Williams: Charles Frederick Carter, 1919-2002 Malcolm Mackintosh: John Erickson, 1929-2002 J. H .R. Davis: Raymond William Firth, 1901-2002 F. M. L. Thompson: Hrothgar John Habakkuk, 1915-2002 A. W. Price: Richard Mervyn Hare, 1919-2002 Hugh Lloyd-Jones: Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, 1921-2003 Michael Lapidge and Peter Matthews: Vivien Anne Law, 1954-2002 Ann Moss: John Lough, 1913-2000 Terence Cave: Ian Dalrymple McFarlane, 1915-2002 Ludwig Paul: David Neil MacKenzie, 1926-2001 Peter Birks: (...) John Kieran Barry Moylan Nicholas, 1919-2002 Jonathan Shepard: Dimitri Dimitrievich Obolensky, 1918-2001 David Cannadine: John Harold Plumb, 1911-2001 Daniel Waley: Nicolai Rubinstein, 1911-2002 Ian Wood: John Michael Wallace-Hadrill, 1916-1985 R. G. M. Nisbet: William Smith Watt, 1913-2002 G. W. Bernard: Richard Bruce Wernham, 1906-1999. (shrink)

Natural property rights are widely viewed as anathema to welfarist taxation, and are pictured as non-contextual, non-relational and resistant to regulation. Here, I argue that many of the major arguments for such views are flawed. Such arguments trade on an ambiguity in the term ‘right’ that makes it possible to conflate the core concept of a right with a situated or specified right from which one can read off people’s actual legal entitlements and duties. I marshal several arguments demonstrating this (...) conflation. In particular, I examine the right to free speech, where contextualization and responsiveness to the requirements of other rights are assumed as a matter of course. I conclude that the existence of one natural right does not foreclose the existence of other natural rights. Arguments for or against welfare rights must be assessed, at least to some extent, independently of the assertion of a natural property right. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance by Lydia SCHUMACHERJohn Marshall DiamondSCHUMACHER, Lydia. Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. xiv + 343 pp. Cloth, $120.00Lydia Schumacher’s recent work, Human Nature in Early Franciscan Thought: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance, is a welcome contribution to the study of the development of scholastic thought on (...) the subject of human nature. Schumacher’s work explores the various facets of theological anthropology in the first half of the thirteenth century by focusing primarily on scholars belonging to the Franciscan Order such as Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, and William of Auvergne, as well as early Dominican scholars such as Roland of Cremona and Hugh of St. Cher. Of central focus in the study is John of La Rochelle, whom the author notes “was the only member of his generation to deal robustly and comprehensively” with not only traditional questions on the soul but also matters of philosophy that had previously been considered beyond the purview of the theologian, topics that included the processes of the body and the psychological makeup of the human being. In addition, John was among the first to embrace the newly translated Arabic sources into his work, most notably the writings of Avicenna.The work is divided into eleven chapters, the first four of which provide a theological background on various authors and their views on the relation between the body and soul and the powers of the soul. The fifth and sixth chapters focus on two works of John of La Rochelle, the Tractatus and the Summa de anima, followed by a study of the reception of Averroes in the first half of the thirteenth century. The work concludes with chapters on the cognitive powers, the affections, free choice, and angels. Schumacher’s study is thorough, providing robust examinations of the individuals and topics, even those who are not central to the study, such as Roland of Cremona and Guerric of St. Quentin. [End Page 161]The book is well written and clearly elucidates the complex schemas of the topics at hand, particularly the nature of the intellect. This is particularly evident in the middle chapters, which examine the ideas of John of La Rochelle, in whose works one finds a multifaceted account of the human intellect. In addition, Schumacher notes an interesting facet of John’s view of cognition, according to which “the mind ‘predetermines’ or influences its understanding of the world.” Thus John’s theory of the act of human rationality, as Schumacher summarizes it, is “arguably achieved at the level of perception, and perception, in turn, is permeated and guided by reason’s quest to know the ‘thing in itself’ apart from matter.” John’s view is then briefly compared to that of William of Auvergne, who argued that perception is “virtually irrelevant” for human understanding. This comparison underscores the rifts that took place during the development of early thirteenth-century thought regarding the nature and function of the intellect as it underwent a profound change from traditionally Augustinian ideas to attempts to reconcile the former with the ideas found in the newly available works of Aristotle and his Arab commentators, namely, Avicenna.The only criticism one might have is that, at times, the chapters seem out of order. For example, after the two chapters that deal extensively with the works of John of La Rochelle, the following chapter is “The Reception of Averroes in Early Scholasticism,” which examines the possible sources “of the three-fold intellectual schema” that is found in John of La Rochelle’s works. Possible sources include not only Averroes but also Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, as well as two anonymous works that John knew and utilized. The chapter itself is presented effectively but makes the work feel somewhat disjointed. On occasion, readers might also find themselves wondering if Schumacher uses John of La Rochelle as a primary example of Franciscan thought in the early thirteenth century, or if the book is indeed about him, and the other figures are considered only to better explain John’s preceding and current... (shrink)

Peter Brian Herrenden Birks 1941-2004Hugh Redwald Dacre 1914-2003William Hugh Clifford Frend 1916-2005John Andrew Gallagher 1919-1980Philip Grierson 1910-2006Stuart Newton Hampshire 1914-2004William McKane 1921-2004John Malcolm Sabine Pasley 1926-2004Benjamin John Pimlott 1945-2004Robert Duguid Forrest Pring-Mill 1925-2005John Edgar Stevens 1921-2002Peter Strawson 1919-2006Henry William Rawson Wade 1918-2004Alan Harold Williams 1927-2005Bernard Arthur Owen Williams 1929-2003John James Wymer 1928-2006.

Michael A. PetersBeijing Normal UniversityMy deepest condolences to Pepe, Dom and Marcus and to Jim’s grandchildren. Tina and I spent a lot of time at the Marshall family home, often attending dinn...

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

PREFACE -/- WHEN first I undertook the study of the theory of Art, many years ago, I was impressed by the emphasis of pleasure attainment in all descriptions of art works, and by the emphatic pleasurableness of my own mental state during the contemplation of artistic productions. -/- My thought being thus turned to the consideration of the relation of æsthetics to hedonics, I was led to make a careful study of the psychology of pleasure and of its correlate pain: (...) the results of this study I here lay before those who may be interested. (shrink)

One controversy about the existence of so called evolutionary forces such as natural selection and random genetic drift concerns the sense in which such “forces” can be said to interact. In this paper I explain how natural selection and random drift can interact. In particular, I show how population-level probabilities can be derived from individual-level probabilities, and explain the sense in which natural selection and drift are embodied in these population-level probabilities. I argue that whatever causal character the individual-level probabilities (...) have is then shared by the population-level probabilities, and that natural selection and random drift then have that same causal character. Moreover, natural selection and drift can then be viewed as two aspects of probability distributions over frequencies in populations of organisms. My characterization of population-level probabilities is largely neutral about what interpretation of probability is required, allowing my approach to support various positions on biological probabilities, including those which give biological probabilities one or another sort of causal character. ‡This paper has benefited from feedback on and discussions of this and earlier work. I want to thank André Ariew, Matt Barker, Lindley Darden, Patrick Forber, Nancy Hall, Mohan Matthen, Samir Okasha, Jeremy Pober, Robert Richardson, Alex Rosenberg, Eric Seidel, Denis Walsh, and Bill Wimsatt. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, HB 414A, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This broad-ranging _Companion_ comprises original contributions from leading Platonic scholars and reflects the different ways in which they are dealing with Plato’s legacy. Covers an exceptionally broad range of subjects from diverse perspectives Contributions are devoted to topics, ranging from perception and knowledge to politics and cosmology Allows readers to see how a position advocated in one of Plato’s dialogues compares with positions advocated in others Permits readers to engage the debate concerning Plato’s philosophical development on particular topics Also includes (...) overviews of Plato’s life, works and philosophical method. (shrink)

Children are the real victims of world hunger: at least 70% of the malnourished people of the world are children. By best estimates forty thousand children a day die of starvation (FAO 1989: 5). Children do not have the ability to forage for themselves, and their nutritional needs are exceptionally high. Hence, they are unable to survive for long on their own, especially in lean times. Moreover, they are especially susceptible to diseases and conditions which are the staple of undernourished (...) people: simple infections and simple diarrhea (UNICEF 1993: 22). Unless others provide adequate food, water, and care, children will suffer and die (WHO 1974: 677, 679). This fact must frame any moral discussions of the problem. And so it does — at least pre-philosophically. When most of us first see pictures of seriously undernourished children, we want to help them, we have a sense of responsibility to them, we feel sympathy toward them (Hume 1978: 368-71). Even those who think we needn't or shouldn't help the starving take this initial response seriously: they go to great pains to show that this sympathetic response should be constrained. They typically claim that assisting the hungry will demand too much of us, or that assistance would be useless and probably detrimental. The efforts of objectors to undermine this natural sympathetic reaction would be pointless unless they saw its psychological force. We want to explain and bolster this sympathetic reaction — this conviction that those of us in a position to help are responsible to the.. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to rebut objections that have been made of the account of the various roles for values in scientific activities that I have developed, initially in my book Is Science Value Free?, in response to criticizing the proposal that science is value free. Specifically I respond to objections that my account does not recognize the significance of basic science, and that my defense of the ideal of impartiality cannot be sustained.

Recent debate on the nature of probabilities in evolutionary biology has focused largely on the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF), which defines fitness in terms of a conception of probability known as “propensity”. However, proponents of this conception of fitness have misconceived the role of probability in the constitution of fitness. First, discussions of probability and fitness have almost always focused on organism effect probability, the probability that an organism and its environment cause effects. I argue that much of the (...) probability relevant to fitness must be organism circumstance probability, the probability that an organism encounters particular, detailed circumstances within an environment, circumstances which are not the organism’s effects. Second, I argue in favor of the view that organism effect propensities either don’t exist or are not part of the basis of fitness, because they usually have values close to 0 or 1. More generally, I try to show that it is possible to develop a clearer conception of the role of probability in biological processes than earlier discussions have allowed. (shrink)

One finds intertwined with ideas at the core of evolutionary theory claims about frequencies in counterfactual and infinitely large populations of organisms, as well as in sets of populations of organisms. One also finds claims about frequencies in counterfactual and infinitely large populations—of events—at the core of an answer to a question concerning the foundations of evolutionary theory. The question is this: To what do the numerical probabilities found throughout evolutionary theory correspond? The answer in question says that evolutionary probabilities (...) are “hypothetical frequencies” (including what are sometimes called “long-run frequencies” and “long-run propensities”). In this paper, I review two arguments against hypothetical frequencies. The arguments have implications for the interpretation of evolutionary probabilities, but more importantly, they seem to raise problems for biologists’ claims about frequencies in counterfactual or infinite populations of organisms and sets of populations of organisms. I argue that when properly understood, claims about frequencies in large and infinite populations of organisms and sets of populations are not threatened by the arguments. Seeing why gives us a clearer understanding of the nature of counterfactual and infinite population claims and probability in evolutionary theory. (shrink)

The results of this paper concern the effective cardinal structure of the subsets of [ω1]<ω1, the set of all countable subsets of ω1. The main results include dichotomy theorems and theorems which show that the effective cardinal structure is complicated.

In Aristotle′s Nicomachean Ethics, at 1149b15–16, there is a quotation: Aristotle does not tell us who wrote these words, and we now find the quotation as lyric fr. adesp. 949.2.

Scientists make judgments of value all the time. They usually evaluate their theories according to “cognitive values” (empirical adequacy, power to make predictions, explanatory power etc). But a theory can also be evaluated according to non-cognitive values (social, political, economical, etc). Traditionally, cognitive and non-cognitive kinds of values are maintained separated from one another in order to protect science’s “autonomy”, impartiality”, and “neutrality”. However, social and moral values, as well as other kinds of non-cognitive values, play their role in science, (...) not only by addressing the ethical issues of scientific research, but also by establishing the strategies according to which the problems to be investigated are chosen, and practical applications are sought. Therefore, science is not “neutral”, nor properly “autonomous” - it is permeated by those non-cognitive values. But scientific research can and should be said “impartial” in relation to the cognitive evaluation of its results, in order to make the progress of the research possible, and to allow a diversity of values to make room for a variety of competing strategies. Key words: cognitive values, non-cognitive values, scientific research, strategies, impartiality. (shrink)